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he historiography on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) has flourished over the past ten years. Many aspects of the Helsinki 
Conference have been analysed and the CSCE is now acknowledged among the 
crucial factors explaining the pace of the fall of communism in Europe.1 The goals and 
policy of numerous participating countries have been scrutinised and appraised, and this 
scholarship has demonstrated that the CSCE was a key instrument in many states’ Cold 
War and European policies. Overall, this CSCE historiography has helped elucidate 
existing different conceptions of détente, and has revealed the relevant role and 
increasing activism of actors other than the superpowers within the European scenario, 
among which the previously overlooked  European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
neutrals feature prominently.2 Yet there is room for further historical inquiries into the 
Helsinki Conference, particularly, though not exclusively, as far as national attitudes and 
policies are concerned. This is certainly the case of the United Kingdom, which is usually 
1 Daniel Thomas, “Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War”, 
Journal of Cold War Studies 7:2 (2005), 110-41; Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas S. Blanton, “The Moscow 
Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret File,” NSA EBB no. 191, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/; Adam Roberts, “An ‘incredibly swift transition’: 
reflections on the end of the Cold War”, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, eds. Melvin Leffler and 
Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), vol. III, 513-34; Rosemary Foot, “The Cold 
War and human rights”, in Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. III, 445-65; Sarah Snyder, Human Rights 
Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
2 Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki 
CSCE (Brussels, Peter Lang, 2009); Thomas Fischer, Neutral power in the CSCE. The N+N States and the 
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“characterised as detached from the CSCE process” (440), and Bozek’s article is therefore 
a welcome addition to the field. 
 
There is indeed an open debate about British attitudes towards the CSCE. This debate 
may be confined to a few scholars, but it has proven quite lively. As Bozek accurately 
reminds us, at one extreme on the spectrum are authors who have described Britain “as 
doubtful about the CSCE and as a late and reluctant convert to the idea that increased 
human contact and greater freedom of information across the Iron Curtain would 
undermine the cohesion of the Eastern bloc” (440); whether arguing in favour of a change 
of heart or a boost in confidence, they detect British conversion to the cause of promoting 
the transformation of Europe only in 1974. Moving towards a more positive appraisal is 
my own view that allies misunderstood British pragmatism, whereas London actually 
“prompted the West to formulate its counterproposals and to pursue proudly its own 
project of détente”.3 At the other extreme on the spectrum we find authors who argue 
that Britain “played a leading role in transforming Soviet proposals for a conference into 
practical measures for ‘normalising’ relations amongst peoples across the Iron Curtain, 
and in bringing the CSCE negotiations to an end on satisfactory terms for the West” 
(440). Bozek clearly takes a halfway position, as he argues that 
 
“on the spectrum of Western attitudes towards the CSCE, (the UK) occupied a moderate 
position. If British expectations were not high, they nevertheless worked diligently to 
defend Western unity, secure the propaganda advantage, and gain some small but 
meaningful concessions to improve the European security landscape, liberalise Eastern 
Europe, and overcome the Iron Curtain” (461). 
 
In listing the reasons behind the British attitude, Bozek does not add to what other 
authors have argued. We knew already that the British were concerned about Soviet 
goals, propaganda losses and gains and their relevance in securing public opinion support 
for continuing defence efforts, and that they warned allies about the dangers of agreeing 
to a security conference on Soviet terms. We also knew that the British did not entirely 
dismiss the call to convene a security conference in order to keep Britain on the détente 
trend and to “catch up with Paris, Bonn, and Washington” (448). Bozek  never claims to 
be innovative on these points. As clearly stated in the introduction, he intends to explore 
these questions further by focusing on “how Britain formulated its CSCE policy between 
the Warsaw Pact’s call for a European security conference in the Budapest Appeal in 
March 1969 and the opening of the MPT in November 1972” (441). 
 
The analysis of the 1969-1972 period represents a welcome contribution to field, as British 
CSCE policy in these years had not yet been thoroughly scrutinised. The author offers a 
more detailed analysis of the discussions and reasoning leading the British government to 
engage with NATO’s debate on and preparations for the Helsinki Conference. He aptly 
3 Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, 151 
2 | P a g e  
                                                        
H-Diplo Article Review 
chooses to consider the British CSCE policy in the wider context of British approach to 
European security matters, and develops his analysis in five chronological sections, i.e. 
the 1960s up to the Prague Spring, the immediate post-Prague 1968, 1969-1970, 1970-1971, 
and 1972. Relying on existing literature, published British documents, and archival 
sources from the UK National Archives, Bozek follows and details to a certain extent the 
backs and forwards of the British government’s thinking about European security, 
détente’s scope and goals, and the opportunity to convene a pan-European conference.  
 
In explaining British swinging, Bozek points to well-known external factors, but has the 
merit to take a closer look at how key political figures and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) officials interpreted the changing European scenario and reconsidered the 
UK’s posture in it. Indeed, it is the attention paid to senior political figures that brings 
Bozek to offer the first significant addition to our knowledge. Martin Brown is right to 
point at the major role of FCO officials, and especially Crispin Tickell.4 Yet this seems to 
apply more to the actual CSCE negotiations. Bozek reveals that UK Prime Ministers and 
the Foreign Secretaries did instigate and direct preparation for the multilateral talks. 
Harold Wilson and Michael Stewart supported the idea of “preparing a ‘List of Issues’ for 
possible negotiation with the Eastern bloc” (449). Edward Heath and Alec Douglas-Home 
more convincingly endorsed the proposal on freer movement, and called the FCO to 
actively work on it. I greatly enjoyed reading about British disappointment with NATO’s 
“unfit for purpose” studies, as well as Douglas-Home’s concerns that “the CSCE would be 
‘largely a jamboree of propaganda’” (453). 
 
The second important contribution of Bozek’s article is backdating the British more pro-
active stance/actual involvement in the CSCE affair to 1971, i.e. before the Multilateral 
Preparatory Talks. Bozek shows that the British encouraged their allies to spell out 
Western values and goals fully, while at the same time made sure that this would not turn 
into a mere confrontational and counterproductive exercise. In Bozek’s words, they 
transformed “the Warsaw Pact’s agenda into the basis for genuine discussions on 
European security” (449). It is, however, rather surprising to see increasing movement of 
people, ideas, and information in Europe, and seeking a declaration of principles that 
would contradict the Brezhnev doctrine listed as British “defensive aims” (453). In fact, 
the two were the key aspects of Western offensive CSCE aims. 
 
Bozek’s analysis is also commendable in that it points to “a multi-faceted policy of 
engagement” consisting “of efforts to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, an optimistic public 
tone about the prospects for the CSCE, and a firm but uncontroversial manner in setting 
forth security objectives” (454). As Bozek shows, the new British policy was not limited to 
4 Martin D. Brown, “A very British vision of Détente: The United Kingdom’s foreign policy during the 
Helsinki process, 1969–1975”, in Overcoming the Iron Curtain: Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 
1945–1990, eds. Frédéric Bozo et al. (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012). 
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propaganda and “presentational technique” (456), it also translated into specific 
proposals.  
 
As much as I like the article, I cannot overlook some inconsistencies and shortcomings. 
First, it is a bit odd to find in the pre-1968 section a reference to what Harold Wilson said 
to Richard Nixon in 1970 about the “potential (…) to influence the top Soviet leadership” 
(443). This reveals Wilson’s thinking in 1970 and should have therefore been placed in the 
post-1968 section, where it would have also provided useful evidence on how the Prime 
Minister came to strengthen his vision of détente. Second, I would have very much 
appreciated a thorough analysis of FCO’s hope “that Western European integration would 
discourage Soviet adventurism in Europe and loosen Eastern European states away from 
the Soviet orbit” (445). This is quite an innovative approach and would have deserved 
more attention, not least as it seems to have posed dangers of destabilising Europe, and 
also sounds inconsistent with the choice to not antagonise Moscow. 
 
The major problem I have with Bozek’s article involves NATO communiqués-related 
aspects. It is quite disappointing that Bozek neither enters into a thorough analysis of 
NATO discussions nor refers to the existing literature dealing with this aspect in detail. 
This leads to a narrow and inaccurate appraisal of both the content and the significance 
of the NATO Ministerial communiqué of May 1970s. Bozek states that 
 
“(w)ith Belgian support against French and American resistance, Britain also secured a 
statement in the May 1970 communiqué declaring that the allies would be ready to enter 
multilateral contacts with the purpose of exploring when negotiations could begin, so far 
as progress was recorded in Bonn’s eastern treaties talks with Moscow and Warsaw, as 
well as in the Four Power talks on Berlin.” (449).  
 
First, NATO being an alliance of fifteen, it would have been useful to know where the 
other members stood on the issue; evidently, there must have been either stronger 
support for the British proposal than just that of Belgium or a quite persuasive action 
from the UK and Belgian representatives to gain other members to their cause. As a 
matter of fact, in March 1969 some West European governments had voiced sympathy for 
the idea of a CSCE, e.g. Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Foreign Minister Willy Brandt 
to the press; Italian Foreign Minister Pietro Nenni before the WEU Assembly. There is 
also evidence that after April 1969 the Italian government invited NATO members to 
follow a common action plan and advocated Western initiatives and proposals for the 
conference agenda.5 Second, and far more important, by failing to compare the content of 
the May 1970 communiqué with the previous December 1969 Declaration, Bozek does not 
show how the former represented a British achievement in “pushing the alliance towards 
a positive public posture on multilateral discussions.” (449). In fact, the NATO 
Declaration of December 1969 had affirmed that the conference was a feasible option in 
5 Romano, From Détente to Europe, 71-73. 
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the general East-West dialogue and had also set some preliminary conditions to its 
convocation: a positive conclusion of the FRG Ostpolitik treaties with the USSR and 
Poland, a quadripartite agreement on Berlin, an agreement to open MBFR negotiations, 
and a positive development in inner-German talks.6 These preconditions were reiterated 
in the following NATO communiqué. It is true that the meeting in Rome debated the 
possibility of moving to the multilateral exploratory phase, but ministers decided to wait 
until sound signs had come of Soviet willingness to negotiate concrete improvements in 
Europe and meet NATO preconditions.7  
 
Finally, there is a major flaw in Bozek’s use of the December 1970 NATO meeting to 
sustain the idea that the new Tory government adopted a more cautious attitude at first. 
The author tells us that 
 
“(a)t NATO’s December ministerial meeting in 1970, Douglas-Home set out to highlight 
the need to be cautious in responding to proposals for a conference, and to argue that 
NATO’s acceptance of multilateral preparatory contacts should be preceded by the 
conclusion of the Berlin talks and Bonn’s eastern treaties” (451)  
 
But how is this different from the previously mentioned Communiqué of May 1970, the 
wording of which he claims had been a British achievement? If, otherwise, Bozek 
intended to suggest that Douglas-Home reined in allies who wished to lift the 
preconditions, he should have let us know about it. 
 
Apart from these weaknesses, Bozek’s appraisal of British achievements is a fairly accurate 
and balanced one. The author fully acknowledges that some British proposals failed to 
gain the allies’ support. He also concedes that the British commitment did remain far 
from enthusiastic and also highly sceptical about the possible outcomes. Yet there are 
intermediate stages between an enthusiastic approach and a lack of genuine enthusiasm 
for the process, and Bozek convincingly argues that “within internal British discourse 
there coexisted both scepticism about the results of the conference and also a positive 
line on the substance of negotiations” (460).  In other words, the British did think it 
unlikely that the CSCE could achieve results, but they came to think that it was worth 
trying, and trying properly. Still, I would have liked to read a more straightforward 
conclusion on what exactly made the British actively involved in the CSCE exercise. Was 
it damage limitation practice, pragmatism, a need to jump on the bandwagon with EEC 
soon-to-be partners, or genuine belief in Western (European) détente strategy? The 
debate may well continue. 
 
6 Declaration of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 5 December 1969, especially parr. 13 and 14. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26760.htm 
7 NATO Final Communiqué, Rome, 26-27 May 1970, especially par. 15. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-
AE9FA0EA-C9E2D744/natolive/official_texts_26789.htm  
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